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As-If Behavioral Economics: Neoclassical Economics in Disguise? 
 
 Nathan Berg* and Gerd Gigerenzer 
 
Abstract: Behavioral economics confronts a problem when it argues for its scientific relevance 
based on claims of superior empirical realism while defending models that are almost surely 
wrong as descriptions of true psychological processes (e.g., prospect theory, hyperbolic 
discounting, and social preference utility functions).  Behavioral economists frequently observe 
that constrained optimization of neoclassical objective functions rests on unrealistic assumptions, 
and proceed by adding new terms and parameters to that objective function and constraint set 
that require even more heroic assumptions about decision processes as arising from solving an 
even more complex constrained optimization problem.  Empirical tests of these more highly 
parameterized models typically rest on comparisons of fit (something equivalent to R-squared) 
rather than genuine out-of-sample prediction.  Very little empirical investigation seeking to 
uncover actual decision processes can be found in this allegedly empirically-motivated 
behavioral literature.  For a research program that counts improved empirical realism among its 
primary goals, it is startling that behavioral economics appears, in many cases, indistinguishable 
from neoclassical economics in its reliance on as-if arguments to justify ―psychological‖ models 
that make no pretense of even attempting to describe the psychological processes that underlie 
human decision making.  Another equally startling similarity is the single normative model that 
both behavioral and neoclassical economists hold out as the unchallenged ideal for correctly 
making decisions.  There are differences: neoclassical economists typically assume that firms 
and consumers conform to axioms such as transitivity, time consistency, Bayesian beliefs, and 
the Savage axioms needed to guarantee that expected utility representations of risk preferences 
exist, whereas behavioral economists commonly measure and model deviations from those 
axioms.  Nevertheless, both programs refer to the same norms, without subjecting to empirical 
investigation the question of whether people who deviate from standard rationality are subject to 
economically significant losses.  In spite of its prolific documentation of deviations from 
neoclassical norms, behavioral economics has produced almost no evidence that these deviations 
are correlated with lower earnings, lower happiness, impaired health, inaccurate beliefs, or 
shorter lives.  We argue for an alternative methodological approach focused on veridical 
descriptions of decision process and a non-axiomatic normative framework: ecological 
rationality, which analyzes the match between decision processes and the environments in which 
they are used. To make behavioral economics, or psychology and economics, a more rigorously 
empirical science will require less effort spent extending as-if utility theory to account for biases 
and deviations, and substantially more careful observation of successful decision makers in their 
respective domains. 
 
 
*Berg is Associate Professor of Economics at University of Texas-Dallas, nberg@utdallas.edu. 
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As-If Behavioral Economics: Neoclassical Economics in Disguise? 
Introduction 
Behavioral economics frequently justifies its insights and modeling approaches with the 
promise, or aspiration, of improved empirical realism (Rabin, 1998, 2002; Thaler, 1991; 
Camerer, 1999, 2003).  Doing economics with ―more realistic assumptions‖ is perhaps the 
guiding theme of behavioral economists, as behavioral economists undertake economic analysis 
without one or more of the unbounded rationality assumptions.  These assumptions, which count 
among the defining elements of the neoclassical, or rational choice, model, are: unbounded self-
interest, unbounded willpower, and unbounded computational capacity.  
Insofar as the goal of replacing these idealized assumptions with more realistic ones 
accurately summarizes the behavioral economics program, we can attempt to evaluate its success 
by assessing the extent to which empirical realism has been achieved.  Measures of empirical 
realism naturally focus on the correspondence between models on the one hand, and the real-
world phenomena they seek to illuminate on the other. This includes both theoretical models and 
empirical descriptions.  Of course, models by definition are abstractions that suppress detail in 
order to focus on relevant features of the phenomenon being described. Nevertheless, given its 
claims of improved realism, one is entitled to ask how much psychological realism has been 
brought into economics by behavioral economists.    
We report below our finding of much greater similarity between behavioral and 
neoclassical economics‘ methodological foundations than has been reported by others.  It 
appears to us that many of those debating behavioral versus neoclassical approaches, or vice 
versa, tend to dramatize differences.  The focus in this paper is on barriers that are common to 
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both neoclassical and behavioral research programs as a result of their very partial commitments 
to empirical realism, indicated most clearly by a shared reliance on Friedman‘s as-if doctrine.   
We want to clearly reveal our own optimism about what can be gained by increasing the 
empirical content of economics and its turn toward psychology.  We are enthusiastic proponents 
of moving beyond the singularity of the rational choice model toward a toolkit approach to 
modeling behavior, with multiple empirically grounded descriptions of the processes that give 
rise to economic behavior and a detailed mapping from contextual variables into decision 
processes used in those contexts (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001).
1
   
Together with many behavioral economists, we are also proponents of borrowing openly 
from the methods, theories, and empirical results that neighboring sciences—including, and 
perhaps, especially, psychology—have to offer, with the overarching aim of adding more 
substantive empirical content.  As the behavioral economics program has risen into a respectable 
practice within the economics mainstream, this paper describes limitations, as we seem them, in 
its methodology that prevent its predictions and insights from reaching as far as they might.  
These limitations result primarily from restrictions on what counts as an interesting question (i.e., 
fitting data measuring outcomes, but not veridical descriptions of decision processes leading to 
those outcomes); timidity with respect to challenging neoclassical definitions of normative 
rationality; and confusion about fit versus prediction in evaluating a model‘s ability to explain 
data. We turn now to three examples. 
                                               
1 Singular definitions of what it means to behave rationally are ubiquitous in the behavioral 
economics literature.  One particularly straightforward articulation of this oddly neoclassical 
tenet appearing as a maintained assumption in behavioral economics is Laibson (2002, p. 22), 
who writes: ―There is basically only one way to be rational.‖ This statement comes from a 
presentation to the Summer Institute of Behavioral Economics organized by the  influential 
―Behavioral Economics Roundtable‖ under the auspices of the Russell Sage Foundation (see 
http://www.russellsage.org/programs/other/behavioral/, and Heukelom, 2007, on the extent of its 
influence). 
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As-If Behavioral Economics: Three Examples 
Loss-Aversion and the Long-Lived Bernoulli Repair Program  
Kahneman and Tversky‘s (1979) prospect theory provides a clear example of as-if 
behavioral economics—a model widely cited as one of the field‘s greatest successes in 
―explaining‖ many of the empirical failures of expected utility theory, but based on a problem-
solving process that very few would argue is realistic.  We detail why prospect theory achieves 
little realism as a decision-making process below.  Paradoxically, the question of prospect 
theory‘s realism rarely surfaces in behavioral economics, in large part because the as-if doctrine, 
based on Friedman (1953) and inherited from neoclassical economics, survives as a 
methodological mainstay in behavioral economics even as it asserts the claim of improved 
empirical realism.
2
  
According to prospect theory, an individual chooses among two or more lotteries 
according to the following procedure.  First, transform the probabilities of all outcomes 
associated with a particular lottery using a nonlinear probability-transformation function.  Then 
transform the outcomes associated with that lottery (i.e., all elements of its support).  Third, 
multiply the transformed probabilities and corresponding transformed lottery outcomes, and sum 
these products to arrive at the subjective value associated with this particular lottery.  Repeat 
                                               
2
 Starmer (2005) provides an original and illuminating methodological analysis that ties as-if 
theory, which appeared in Friedman and Savage a few years before Friedman‘s famous 1953 
essay, to potential empirical tests that no one has yet conducted.  Starmer shows that both 
Friedman and Savage defended expected utility theory on the basis of the as-if defense.  
Paradoxically, however, both of them wind up relying on a tacit model of mental process to 
justify the proposition that mental processes should be ignored in economics.  Starmer writes: 
―This ‗as if‘ strategy entails that theories not be judged in terms of whether they are defensible 
models of mental processes. So to invoke a model of mental process as a defence of the theory 
would … not seem … consistent.‖ 
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these steps for all remaining lotteries in the choice set.  Finally, choose the lottery with the 
largest subjective value, computed according to the method above.  
How should one assess the empirical realism achieved by this modeling strategy relative 
to its predecessor, expected utility theory?  Both prospect theory and expected utility theory 
suffer from the shortcoming of assuming that risky choice always emerges from a process of 
weighting and averaging (i.e., integration) of all relevant pieces of information.  Both theories 
posit, with little supporting evidence (Starmer, 2005) and considerable opposing evidence (e.g., 
Branstätter, Gigerenzer and Hertwig, 2006; Leland, 1994; Payne and Braunstein, 1978; 
Rubinstein, 1988; Russo and Dosher, 1983), that the subjective desirability of lotteries depends 
on all the information required to describe the lottery‘s distribution, in addition to auxiliary 
functions and parameters that pin down how probabilities and outcomes are transformed.  This is 
not even to mention the deeper problem that in many, if not most, interesting choice problems 
(e.g., buying a house, choosing a career, or deciding whom to marry), the decision maker knows 
only a tiny subset of the objectively feasible action set (Hayek, 1945), the list of outcomes 
associated with lotteries, or the probabilities of the known outcomes (Knight, 1921).  These 
assumptions in both expected utility theory and prospect theory—of transforming, multiplying 
and adding, as well as exhaustive knowledge of actions and outcomes (i.e., event spaces 
associated with each action)—are equally defensible, or indefensible, in both theories, since they 
play nearly identical roles in both theories. 
The similarities between prospect theory and expected utility theory should come as no 
surprise. Gigerenzer (2008, p. 90) and Güth (1995, 2008) have described the historical 
progression—from expected value maximization (as a standard of rationality) to expected utility 
theory and then on to prospect theory—as a ―repair program‖ aimed at resuscitating the 
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mathematical operation of weighted integration, based on the definition of mathematical 
expectation, as a theory of mind.  Expected-value maximization was once regarded as a proper 
standard of rationality.  It was then confronted by the St. Petersburg Paradox, however, and 
Daniel Bernoulli began the repair program by transforming the outcomes associated with 
lotteries using a logarithmic utility of money function (or utility of change in money—see 
Jorland, 1987, on interpreting Bernoulli‘s units in the expected utility function).  This 
modification survived and grew as expected utility theory took root in 20
th
 century neoclassical 
economics.  Then came Allais‘ Paradox, which damaged expected utility theory‘s ability to 
explain observed behavior, and a new repair appeared in the form of prospect theory, which 
introduced more transformations with additional parameters, to square the basic operation of 
probability-weighted averaging with observed choices over lotteries. 
Instead of asking how real people—both successful and unsuccessful—choose among 
gambles, the repair program focused on transformations of payoffs (which produced expected 
utility theory) and, later, transformations of probabilities (which produced prospect theory) to fit, 
rather than predict, data.  The goal of the repair program appeared, in some ways, to be more 
statistical than intellectual: adding parameters and transformations to ensure that a weighting-
and-adding objective function, used incorrectly as a model of mind, could fit observed choice 
data.  We return to the distinction between fit versus prediction below. The repair program is 
based largely on tinkering with the mathematical form of the mathematical expectation operator 
and cannot be described as a sustained empirical effort to uncover the process by which people 
actually choose gambles.   
 
Fehr’s Social Preference Program 
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 The insight that people care about others‘ payoffs, or that social norms influence 
decisions, represents a welcome expansion of the economic analysis of behavior, which we 
applaud and do not dispute.
3
 Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and numerous others, have attempted to 
demonstrate empirically that people generally are other-regarding.  Other-regarding preferences 
imply that, among a set of allocations in which one‘s own payoff is exactly the same, people may 
still have strict rankings over those allocations because they care about the payoffs of others. 
Fehr and Schmidt‘s empirical demonstrations begin with a modification of the utility function 
and addition of at least two new free parameters.  Instead of maximizing a ―neoclassical‖ utility 
function that depends only on own payoffs, Fehr and Schmidt assume that people maximize a 
―behavioral‖ or other-regarding utility function.  This other-regarding utility function, in addition 
to a standard neoclassical term registering psychic satisfaction with own payoffs, includes two 
arguments that are non-standard in the previous neoclassical literature: positive deviations of 
own payoffs from other players‘ payoffs and negative deviations, each weighted with its own 
parameter.   
 As a psychological model, Fehr and Schmidt are essentially arguing that, although it is 
not realistic to assume individuals maximize a utility function depending on own payoffs alone, 
we can add psychological realism by assuming that individuals maximize a more complicated 
utility function.  This social preferences utility function ranks allocations by weighting and 
summing to produce a utility score for each allocation, and choice is by definition the allocation 
with the highest score.  The decision process that maximization of a social preferences utility 
function implies begins, just like any neoclassical model, with exhaustive search through the 
                                               
3 Binmore and Shaked (2007) argue that the tools of classical and neoclassical economics can easily take social 
factors into account and need not be set off from neoclassical under the behavioral banner.  But although Binmore 
and Shaked are correct, in principle, that utility theory does not preclude other people‘s consumption from entering 
the utility function, they fail to acknowledge the key role of the no-externalities assumption (i.e., no channels other 
than price for individuals to affect each other) in the Welfare Theorems and for normative economics in general. 
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decision maker‘s choice space.  It assigns benefits and costs to each element in that space based 
on a weighted sum of the intrinsic benefits of own payoffs, the psychic benefits of being ahead of 
others, and the psychic costs of falling behind others.  Finally, the decision maker chooses the 
feasible action with the largest utility score based on weighted summation. If the weights on the 
―social preferences‖ terms in the utility function registering psychic satisfaction from deviations 
between own and other payoffs are estimated to be different than zero, then Fehr and Schmidt 
ask us to conclude that they have produced evidence confirming their social preference model. 
 This approach almost surely fails at bringing improved psychological insight about the 
manner in which social variables systematically influence choice in real-world settings.  Think of 
a setting in which social variables are likely to loom large, and ask yourself whether it sounds 
reasonable that people deal with these settings by computing the benefits of being ahead of 
others, the costs of falling behind the others, and the intrinsic benefits of own payoffs—and then, 
after weighting and adding these three values for each element in the choice set, choosing the 
best.  This is not a process model but an as-if model.  Could anyone defend this process on the 
basis of psychological realism? In addition, the content of the mathematical model is barely more 
than a circular explanation: When participants in the ultimatum game share equally or reject 
positive offers, this implies non-zero weights on the ―social preferences‖ terms in the utility 
function, and the behavior is then attributed to ―social preferences.‖  
 A related concern is the lack of attempts to replicate parameter estimates. Binmore and 
Shaked (2007) raise this point in a critique of Fehr and Schmidt (1999)—and of experimental 
economics more generally.  Binmore and Shaked point out that, if Fehr and Schmidt‘s model is 
to be taken seriously as an innovation in empirical description, then a single parameterized 
version of it should make out-of-sample predictions and be tested on multiple data sets—without 
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adjusting parameters to each new data set. According to Binmore and Shaked, Fehr and Schmidt 
use very different (i.e., inconsistent) parameter estimates in different data sets.  To appreciate the 
point, one should recall the large number of free parameters in the Fehr and Schmidt model when 
subjects are allowed to all have different parameters weighting the three terms in the utility 
function.  This huge number of degrees of freedom allows the model to trivially fit many sets of 
data well without necessarily achieving any substantive improvements in out-of-sample 
prediction over neoclassical models or competing behavioral theories.   Binmore and Shaked 
write:  
[T]he scientific gold standard is prediction. It is perfectly acceptable to 
propose a theory that fits existing experimental data and then to use the data to 
calibrate the parameters of the model. But, before using the theory in applied 
work, the vital next step is to state the proposed domain of application of the 
theory, and to make specific predictions that can be tested with data that 
wasn‘t used either in formulating the theory or in calibrating its parameters. 
This may seem so basic as to not be worth repeating.  Yet the distinction between fit and 
prediction, which has been made repeatedly by others (Roberts and Pashler, 2000), seems to be 
largely ignored in much of the behavioral economics literature.  Behavioral models frequently 
add new parameters to a neoclassical model, which necessarily increases R-squared.  Then this 
increased R-squared is used as empirical support for the behavioral models without subjecting 
them to out-of-sample prediction tests. 
 
Hyperbolic Discounting and Time-Inconsistency 
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Laibson‘s (1997) model of impulsiveness consists, in essence, of adding a parameter to 
the neoclassical model of maximizing an exponentially weighted sum of instantaneous utilities to 
choose an optimal sequence of quantities of consumption.  Laibson‘s new parameter reduces the 
weight of all terms in the weighted sum of utilities except for the term representing utility of 
current consumption.  This, in effect, puts more weight on the present by reducing weight on all 
future acts of consumption.   
Thus, the psychological process involved has hardly changed at all relative to the 
neoclassical model from which the behavioral modification was derived.  The decision maker is 
assumed to make an exhaustive search of all feasible consumption sequences, compute the 
weighted sum of utility terms for each of these sequences, and choose the one with highest 
weighted utility score.  The parameters of this model are then estimated. To the extent that the 
estimated value of the parameter that reduces weight on the future deviates from the value that 
recovers the neoclassical version of the model with perfectly exponential weighting, Laibson 
asks us to interpret this as empirical confirmation—both of his model, and of a psychological 
bias to over-weight the present over the future. 
 Another example is O‘Donoghue and Rabin (2006), who suggest that willpower 
problems can be dealt with by taxing potato chips and subsidizing carrots, to induce people to 
overcome their biased minds and eat healthier diets.  This formulation, again, assumes a virtually 
neoclassical decision process based on constrained optimization in which behavior is finely 
attuned to price and financial incentives, in contrast to more substantive empirical accounts of 
actual decision processes at work in food choice (Wansink, 2006). 
 
Neoclassical + New Parameters with Psychological Names = Behavioral Economics? 
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 A Widely Practiced Approach to Behavioral Economics: “More Stuff” in the Utility Function 
In a frequently cited review article in the Journal of Economic Literature, Rabin (1998) 
argues that ―greater psychological realism will improve mainstream economics.‖  He then goes 
on to describe the improvement to economics that psychology has to offer, not as more accurate 
empirical description of the decision processes used by firms and consumers, and not as a broad 
search for new explanations of behavior.  Rather, Rabin states that the motivation for behavioral 
economists to borrow from psychology is to produce a more detailed specification of the utility 
function: ―psychological research can teach us about the true form of the function U(x).‖  Thus, 
rather than questioning the rationality axioms of completeness, transitivity, and other technical 
requirements for utility function representations of preferences to exist—and ignoring the more 
substantive and primitive behavioral question of how humans actually choose and decide—
Rabin lays out a behavioral economic research program narrowly circumscribed to fit within the 
basic framework of Pareto, Hicks and Samuelson, historical connections that we return to below.  
According to Rabin, the full scope of what can be accomplished by opening up economics to 
psychology is the discovery of new inputs in the utility function. 
 
Behavioral Utility Functions: Still Unrealistic As Descriptions of Decision Process 
Leading models in the rise of behavioral economics rely on Friedman‘s as-if doctrine by 
putting forward more unrealistic processes—that is, describing behavior as the process of 
solving a constrained optimization problem that is more complex—than the simpler neoclassical 
model they were meant to improve upon.  Many theoretical models in behavioral economics 
consist of slight generalizations of otherwise familiar neoclassical models, with new parameters 
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in the objective function or constraint set that represent psychological phenomena or at least have 
psychological labels.   
To its credit, this approach has the potential advantage of facilitating clean statistical tests 
of rational choice models by nesting them within a larger, more general model class so that the 
rational choice model can be tested simply by checking parameter restrictions.  But because the 
addition of new parameters in behavioral models is almost always motivated in terms of 
improving the realism of the model—making its descriptions more closely tied to observational 
data—one can justifiably ask how much additional psychological realism is won from this kind 
of modeling via modification of neoclassical models.  The key point is that the resulting 
behavioral model hangs onto the central assumption in neoclassical economics concerning 
behavioral process—namely, that all observed actions are the result of a process of constrained 
optimization.  As others have pointed out, this methodology, which seeks to add behavioral 
elements as extensions of neoclassical models, paradoxically leads to optimization problems that 
are more complex to solve (Winter 1964, p.252, quoted in Cohen and Dickens, 2002; Sargent, 
1993; Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001).
4
   
Aside from this paradox of increasing complexity found in many bounded rationality 
models, there is the separate question of whether any empirical evidence actually supports the 
modified versions of the models in question.  If we do not believe that people are solving 
complex optimization problems—and there is no evidence documenting that the psychological 
                                               
4
 Lipman (1999) argues that it is okay if the model representing boundedly rational agents who 
cannot solve problem P is the solution to a more complex problem P‘.  Lipman‘s argument is that 
the solution to this more complex problem is the modeler‘s ―representation‖ and should not be 
interpreted as a claim that the decision maker actually solves the harder problem P‘.  But this 
strikes us as an indirect invocation of Friedman‘s as-if doctrine. 
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processes of interest are well described by such models—then we are left only with as-if 
arguments to support them.  
  
Commensurability 
A more specific methodological point on which contemporary behavioral and 
neoclassical economists typically agree is the use of standard functional forms when specifying 
utility functions, which impose the assumption—almost surely wrong—of universal 
commensurability between all inputs in the utility function.  In standard utility theory, where the 
vector (x1,..,xj,…,xk,…xN)  represents quantities of goods with the jth and kth element 
represented by xj and xk, respectively, commensurability can be defined as follows.  For any pair 
of goods represented by the indexes j and k, j ≠ k, and for any reduction r in the kth good, 0 < r  
<xj, there exists a quantity of compensation in units of the kth good, c > 0, such that the 
consumer is at least as well off as she was with the original commodity bundle: 
U(x1,..,xj - r,…,xk + c,…xN 1,..,xj,…,xk,…xN) .  
This is sometimes referred to as the Archimedean principle. Geometrically, commensurability 
implies that all indifference curves asymptote to the x-axis and y-axis.  Economically, 
commensurability implies that when we shop for products represented as bundles of features 
(e.g., houses represented as vectors of attributes, such as square footage, price, number of 
bathrooms, quality of nearby schools, etc.), then no un-dominated items can be discarded from 
the consideration set.  Instead of shoppers imposing hard-and-fast requirements (e.g., do not 
consider houses with less than 2000 square feet),commensurable utility functions imply that 
smaller houses must remain in the consideration set. If the price is low enough, or the number of 
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bathrooms is large enough, or the quality of schools is high enough, then a house of any size 
could provide the ―optimal‖ bundle of features.   
Edgeworth included commensurability among the fundamental axioms of choice.  
Psychologists since Maslow have pointed out, however, that people‘s preferences typically 
exhibit distinctly lexicographic structure. Moreover, the structures of environments that elicit 
compensatory and noncompensatory strategies are relatively well known. An early review of 
process tracing studies concluded that there is clear evidence for noncompensatory heuristics, 
whereas evidence for weighting and adding strategies is restricted to tasks with small numbers of 
alternatives and attributes (Ford et al., 1989).  
Recently, researchers in psychology and marketing have produced new evidence of 
lexicographic strategies that prove very useful in high-dimensional environments for quickly 
shrinking choice sets down to a manageable set of alternatives. The reduction of size in the 
consideration sets proceeds by allowing a few choice attributes to completely over-rule others 
among the list of features associated with each element in the choice set.  This obviates the need 
for pairwise tradeoffs among the many pairs of choices and enables choice to proceed in a 
reasonable amount of time (Yee, Dahan, Hauser and Orlin, 2007).  In a choice set with N 
undominated elements where each element is a vector of K features, complete ranking (needed to 
find the optimum) requires consideration of KN(N-1)/2 pairwise tradeoffs, which is the number 
of features of any alternative multiplied by a quadratic in the number of elements that represents 
the number of unordered pairs in the choice set. 
 Although interesting game-theoretic treatments of lexicographic games have appeared 
(Binmore and Samuelson, 1992; Blume, Brandenburger and Dekel, 1991), behavioral and 
neoclassical economists routinely seem to forget the absurd implications of universal 
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commensurability, with its unrealistic implication of ruling out lexicographic choice rules. If, for 
example, x represents a positive quantity of ice cream and y represents time spent with one‘s 
grandmother, then as soon as we write down the utility function U(x, y) and endow it with the 
standard assumptions that imply commensurability, the unavoidable implication is that there 
exists a quantity of ice cream that can compensate for the loss of nearly all time with one‘s 
grandmother.  The essential role of social interaction, and time to nurture high quality social 
interactions as a primary and unsubstitutable source of happiness, is emphasized by Bruni and 
Porta‘s (2007) recent volume on the economics of happiness.  The disadvantage of ruling out 
lexicographic choice and inference also rules out their advantage of time and effort savings, in 
addition to improved out-of-sample prediction in some settings (Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, and 
Goldstein, 1999; Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009).   
 
Fit Versus Prediction 
Given that many behavioral economics models feature more free parameters than the 
neoclassical models they seek to improve upon, an adequate empirical test requires more than a 
high degree of within-sample fit (i.e., increased R-squared).  Arguing in favor of new, highly 
parameterized models by pointing to what amounts to a higher R-squared (sometimes even only 
slightly higher) is, however, a widely practiced rhetorical form in behavioral economics 
(Binmore and Shaked, 2007). 
 Brandstätter et al. (2006) showed that cumulative prospect theory (which has five 
adjustable parameters) over-fits in each of four data sets. For instance, among 100 pairs of two-
outcome gambles (Erev et al., 2002), cumulative prospect theory with a fit-maximizing choice of 
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parameters chooses 99 percent of the gambles chosen by the majority of experimental subjects. 
That sounds impressive.  But, of course, more free parameters always improves fit. 
 The more challenging test of a theory is in prediction using a single set of fixed 
parameters. Using the parameter values estimated in the original Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
study, cumulative prospect theory could predict only 75 percent of the majority choices.  The 
priority heuristic (a simple lexicographic heuristic with no adjustable parameters), in contrast, 
predicts 85 percent of majority choices. Moreover, when the ratio of expected values is larger 
than two (so-called ―easy problems‖ where there is wide consensus among most subjects that one 
gamble dominates the other), cumulative prospect theory does not predict better than expected 
value or expected utility maximization (Brandstätter, Gigerenzer and Hertwig, 2008, Figure 1). 
When the ratio of expected values is smaller, implying less consensus among subjects about the 
ranking of two gambles, the priority heuristic predicts far better than cumulative prospect theory. 
Thus, in prediction, cumulative prospect theory does not perform better than models with no free 
parameters.  
Examples of psychological parameters introduced to generalize otherwise standard 
neoclassical models include Kahneman and Tversky‘s (1979) prospect theory in which new 
parameters are needed to pin down the shape of functions that under- or over-weight 
probabilities; Laibson‘s (1997) model of impulsiveness expressed in terms of new parameters 
controlling the shape of non-exponential weights in the inter-temporal optimization problem 
referred to as hyperbolic discounting; and Fehr and Schmidt‘s (1999) psychic weights on 
differences between own and others‘ payoffs.  There are many other examples, which include 
overconfidence (with at least three different versions concerning biases in first and/or second 
moments and own beliefs versus the beliefs of others); biased belief models; ―mistake‖ or 
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tremble probabilities; and social preference utility functions with parameters that measure 
subjective concern for other people‘s payoffs. 
By virtue of this modeling strategy based on constrained optimization, with virtually all 
empirical work addressing the fit of outcomes rather than justifying the constrained optimization 
problem-solving process itself,  behavioral economics follows the Friedman as-if doctrine in 
neoclassical economics focusing solely on outcomes.  By adding parameters to increase the R-
squared of behavioral models‘ fit, many behavioral economists tacitly (and sometimes explicitly) 
deny the importance of correct empirical description of the processes that lead to those decision 
outcomes.   
 
Behavioral and Neoclassical Economics Share a Single Normative Model 
Is there such a thing as normative behavioral economics?  At first, behavioral economists 
such as Tversky, Kahneman, Frank and Thaler almost unanimously said no (Berg, 2003).   
 
The Early Normative View: Deviations Are Strictly Descriptive, No Normative Behavioral 
Economics Needed 
Tversky and Kahneman (1986) write: 
The main theme of this article has been that the normative and the descriptive 
analysis of choice should be viewed as separate enterprises. This conclusion 
suggests a research agenda. To retain the rational model in its customary 
descriptive role, the relevant bolstering assumptions must be validated. Where 
these assumptions fail, it is instructive to trace the implications of the 
descriptive analysis.  
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Perhaps it was a reassuring sales pitch when introducing behavioral ideas to neoclassical 
audiences.  But for some reason, early behavioral economists argued that behavioral economics 
is purely descriptive and does not in any way threaten the normative or prescriptive authority of 
the neoclassical model.  These authors argued that, when one thinks about how he or she ought 
to behave, we should all agree that the neoclassical axioms ought to be satisfied.  This is 
Savage‘s explanation for his own ―mistaken‖ choice after succumbing to the Allais Paradox and 
subsequently revising it ―after reflection‖ to square consistently with expected utility theory 
(Starmer, 2004).  By this unquestioning view toward the normative authority of the neoclassical 
model, the only work for behavioral economics is descriptive—to document empirical deviations 
from neoclassical axioms: transitivity violations, expected utility violations, time-inconsistency, 
non-Nash play, non-Bayesian beliefs, etc.  
Fourteen years before writing ―Libertarian Paternalism,‖ Thaler also explicitly warms not 
to draw normative inferences from his work (Thaler, 1991, p. 138):  
A demonstration that human choices often violate the axioms of rationality 
does not necessarily imply any criticism of the axioms of rational choice as a 
normative idea. Rather, the research is simply intended to show that for 
descriptive purposes, alternative models are sometimes necessary. 
 Continuing this discussion of what behavioral economics implies about the use of 
rationality axioms in normative analysis, Thaler (1991, p. 138) argues that the major contribution 
of behavioral economics has been the discovery of a collection of ―illusions,‖ completely 
analogous to optical illusions. Thaler interprets these ―illusions‖ as unambiguously incorrect 
departures from the ―rational‖ or correct way of making decisions. Thaler is explicit in accepting 
neoclassical axioms of individual preferences (e.g. transitivity, completeness, non-satiation, 
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monotonicity, and the Savage axioms which guarantee that preferences over risky payoffs can be 
represented by an expected utility function) as the proper normative ideal when he writes: ―It 
goes without saying that the existence of an optical illusion that causes us to see one of two equal 
lines as longer than the other should not reduce the value we place on accurate measurement. On 
the contrary, illusions demonstrate the need for rulers!‖  
In his interpretation of optical illusions, Thaler does not seem to realize that, if the human 
faculty of visual perception mapped two-dimensional images directly onto our retinas and into 
the brain without filtering, then we would have an objectively inferior grasp on reality.  Consider 
a photograph of railroad tracks extending into the distance, which appear narrower and narrower 
when projected into two-dimensional space but are filtered in our minds as maintaining constant 
width in three-dimensional space.  Thaler seems to suggest that when we see the train tracks 
narrowing in their two-dimensional representation, we would be more rational to see them as 
narrowing rather than synthesizing the third dimension that is not really there in the photo.  
Without deviating from this direct translation of the information in two-dimensional space, our 
minds would perceive the tracks as uneven and unsuitable for any train to run on.   
To correctly perceive reality, perceptive faculties must add information, make intelligent 
bets, and consequently get it wrong some of the time.  A line that extends into the third 
dimension has a shorter projection on the retina than a horizontal line of the same length.  Our 
brains correct for this by enlarging the subjective length of the line that extends into the third 
dimension, which works in the real three-dimensional world, but results in optical illusions when 
interpreting information on two-dimensional paper.  Our brains are intelligent exactly because 
they make informed guesses, and go beyond the information given. More generally, intelligent 
systems depend on processes that make useful errors (Gigerenzer, 2008).  
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Yet, in showing that human decisions contradict the predictions of expected utility 
theory, there is no analog to the straight lines of objectively equal length. Unlike the simple 
geometric verification of equal lengths against which incorrect perceptions may be verified, the 
fact that human decisions do not satisfy the axioms underlying expected utility theory in no way 
implies an illusion or a mistake. Expected utility theory is, after all, but one model of how to 
rank risky alternatives. Those who insist that standard neoclassical theory provides a singularly 
correct basis for normative analysis in spite of systematic departures in the empirical record 
assert, in effect, that behavioral economics is a purely descriptive field of inquiry (Berg 2003). 
 
A Second Normative View: Designing Policy to Achieve Conformity With Neoclassical Norms 
Fast forward 10 years, and behavioral economists now can be found regularly offering 
prescriptive policy advice based on behavioral economics models.  The stakes have risen in 
recent years and months, as financial market crises generate new skepticism about the 
―rationality of markets.‖  Behavioral economists who decades ago pitched the behavioral 
approach to the neoclassical mainstream as a purely descriptive enterprise (e.g., Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1986; Thaler, 1991; Frank, 1991—and nearly everyone else published in top-ranked 
economics journals), now advocate using behavioral concepts for prescriptive policy purposes 
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Frank, 2008; Amir, Ariely, Cooke, Dunning, Epley, Koszegi, 
Lichtenstein, Mazar, Mullainathan, Prelec, Shafir, and Silva, 2005).  This evolution in boldness 
about looking for prescriptive implications of behavioral economics does not, unfortunately, 
imply increased boldness about modifying the neoclassical axiomatic formulations of rationality 
as the unquestioned gold standard for how humans ought to behave.     
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One specific example of this view that humans are biased and pathological—based on the 
biases and heuristics literature‘s abundant empirical accounts of deviations from neoclassical 
rationality axioms (but not tied empirically to substantive economic pathology)—is Bernheim 
and Rangel (2007).  They suggest new approaches to regulation and policy making based on the 
dominant behavioral economics view of ubiquitous behavioral pathology.  Jolls, Sunstein and 
Thaler (1998) write of the need to write laws that ―de-bias‖ individual decision making.  Rather 
than resting on direct observation of bad-performing decision-making processes embedded in 
real-world decision-making domains, these prescriptive claims follow from psychological 
parameter estimates fitted, in many cases, to a single sample of data.  The estimated parameter 
that maximizes fit leads to a rejection of the neoclassical model nested within the encompassing 
behavioral model, and readers are asked to interpret this as direct, prima facie evidence of 
pathological decision making in need of correction through policy intervention.  
 
Predictably Stupid, Smart, or None of the Above 
Rabin (2002) says psychology teaches about departures from rationality.  Diamond 
(2008) writes that a major contribution of ―behavioral analysis is the identification of 
circumstances where people are making ‗mistakes.‘‖  Beshears, Choi, Laibson and Madrian 
(2008) introduce a technique for identifying mistakes, formulated as mismatches in revealed 
preference versus what they call normative preferences, which refer to preferences that conform 
to neoclassical axioms.  To these writers (and many if not most others in behavioral economics), 
the neoclassical normative model is unquestioned, and empirical investigation consists primarily 
of documenting deviations from that normative model, which are automatically interpreted as 
pathological.  In other words, the normative interpretation of deviations as mistakes does not 
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follow from an empirical investigation linking deviations to negative outcomes.  The empirical 
investigation is limited to testing whether behavior conforms to a neoclassical normative ideal. 
Bruni and Sugden (2007) point out the similar methodological defense needed to 
rationalize the common normative interpretations in both neoclassical and behavioral economics: 
 The essential idea behind the discovered preference hypothesis is that 
rational-choice theory is descriptive of the behaviour of economic agents who, 
through experience and deliberation, have learned to act in accordance with 
their underlying preferences; deviations from that theory are interpreted as 
short-lived errors. 
 The discussion of methodological realism with respect to the rational choice framework 
almost necessarily touches on different visions of what should count as normative.  It is a great 
irony that most voices in behavioral economics, purveyors of a self-described opening up of 
economic analysis to psychology, hang on to the idea of the singular and universal supremacy of 
rational choice axioms as the proper normative benchmarks against which virtually all forms of 
behavior are to be measured.  Thus, it is normal rather than exceptional to read behavioral 
economists championing the descriptive virtues of expanding the economic model to allow for 
systematic mistakes and biased beliefs and, at the same time, arguing that there is no question as 
to what a rational actor ought to do.   
This odd tension between descriptive openness and normative dogmaticism is interesting, 
and future historians of behavioral economics will surely investigate further the extent to which 
this hardening of the standard normative model in the writings of behavioral economists served 
as compensation for out-and-out skeptics of allowing psychology into economics—perhaps, in 
order to persuade gatekeepers of mainstream economics to become more accepting of behavioral 
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models when pitched as an exclusively descriptive tool.  One reason why the tension is so 
interesting is that almost no empirical evidence exists documenting that individuals who deviate 
from economic axioms of internal consistency (e.g., transitive preferences, expected utility 
axioms, and Bayesian beliefs) actually suffer any economic losses.   No studies we are aware of 
show that deviators from rational choice earn less money, live shorter lives, or are less happy.  
The evidence, to date, which we describe in a later section, suggests rather the opposite.   
Like neoclassical economists, behavioral economists assert that logical deduction rather 
than inductively derived descriptions of behavioral process are the proper starting point for 
economic analysis.  Behavioral economists allow that real people‘s beliefs (and nearly 
everything else the neoclassical model specifies) may deviate from this deductive starting point 
in practice.  But they insist that these individuals who deviate from axiomatic rationality should 
aspire to minimize deviance and conform to the neoclassical ideal as much as possible.  
 
Ecological Rationality 
A Definition Based On The Extent Of Match Between Behavior and Environments 
It is no trivial question as to whether substantive rather than axiomatic rationality requires 
preferences to exist at all.  The essentializing concept of a stable preference ordering ignores the 
role of context and environment as explanatory variables that might condition what it means to 
make a good decision.  In this regard, preferences in economics are analogous to personality 
traits in psychology.  They seek to explain behavior as a function of exclusively inherent and 
essential contents of the individual rather than investigating systematic interaction of the 
individual and the choice or decision environment. 
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 In contrast, the normative framework of ecological rationality eschews universal norms 
that generalize across all contexts, and instead requires decision processes to match well with the 
environments in which they are used (Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Group, 1999).  Ecological 
rationality focuses on the question of which heuristics are adapted to which environments. 
Vernon Smith‘s definition of ecological rationality is virtually the same, except that he replaces 
―heuristics‖ with ―institutions‖ or ―markets.‖ 
When heuristics, or decision processes—or action rules—function well in particular 
classes of environments, then ecological rationality is achieved.  When systematic problems 
arise, the diagnosis does not lay blame exclusively on badly behaved individuals (as in 
behavioral economics) or external causes in the environment (as in many normative analyses 
from sociology).  Rather, problems are diagnosed in terms of mis-matched decision process and 
environment, which suggests more degrees of freedom (than the universally pathological view 
based on a normative ideal of omniscience) when prescribing corrective policy and new 
institutional design.   
 
Better Norms 
Given the explicitly stated commitment in behavioral economics to empiricism and 
broader methodological openness (borrowing from psychology and sociology), it is surprising 
that behavioral economics would adhere so closely to the normative neoclassical model, because 
there are real alternatives in terms of positive normative frameworks from fields such as 
psychology, Austrian economics, social economics, biology, and engineering.  In spite of 
hundreds of papers that purport to document various forms of ―irrationality‖ (e.g., preference 
reversals, deviations from Nash play in strategic interaction, violations of expected utility theory, 
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time inconsistency, non-Bayesian beliefs), there is almost no evidence that such deviations lead 
to any economic costs.
5
  Thus—separate from the lack of evidence that humans make high-
stakes decisions by solving constrained optimization problems—much of the behavioral 
economics research program is predicated on an important normative hypothesis for which there 
is, as yet, very little evidence. 
 Are people with intransitive preferences money-pumped in real life?  Do expected utility 
violators earn less money, live shorter lives, or feel less happy?  Do non-Bayesians 
systematically misperceive important frequencies and incur real economic losses as a result? 
 These questions would seem to be the key stylized facts in need of firm empirical 
justification in order to motivate the prolific research output in behavioral economics 
documenting biases and deviations.  But instead of empirical motivation, behavioral 
economics—while justifying itself in terms of more rigorous empiricism—puzzlingly follows the 
neoclassical tradition laid out by Pareto in justifying its normative positions by vague, 
introspective appeals to reasonableness, without empirical inquiry (Starmer, 2005).   
Our own empirical research tries to answer some of these questions about the economic 
costs of deviating from neoclassical axioms, with surprising results.  Expected utility violators 
and time-inconsistent decision makers earn more money in experiments (Berg, Johnson, Eckel, 
2009). And the beliefs about PSA testing of non-Bayesians are more accurate than those of 
perfect Bayesians—that is, better calibrated to objective risk frequencies in the real-world 
decision-making environment (Berg, Biele and Gigerenzer, 2008).  So far, it appears that people 
who violate neoclassical coherence, or consistency, axioms are better off as measured by 
correspondence metrics such as earnings and accuracy of beliefs.  Recall that according to 
                                               
5 One recent example is DeMiguel et al (forthcoming), who finds that portfolios which deviate from the normative 
CAPM model by using a simple 1/N heuristic produce higher expected returns and lower risk, relative to portfolios 
chosen according to CAPM. 
26 
 
rationality norms requiring only internal coherence, one can be perfectly consistent, and yet 
wrong about everything (Hammond, 1996).  
There are a growing number of theoretical models, too, where individuals (Dekel, 1999; 
Compte and Postlewaite, 2004) and markets (Berg and Lien, 2005) do better with incorrect 
beliefs.  These results pose fundamental questions about the normative status of assumptions 
regarding probabilistic beliefs and other core assumptions of the rational choice framework.  If 
individuals and aggregates both do better (Berg and Gigerenzer, 2007) when, say, individuals 
satisfice instead of maximize, then there would seem to be no market discipline or evolutionary 
pressure (arguments often invoked by defenders of the normative status of rationality axioms) to 
enforce conformity with rationality axioms, which focus primarily on internal consistency rather 
than evaluation of outcomes themselves. 
 In a variety of binary prediction tasks, Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC Group (1999) 
have shown that simple heuristics that ignore information and make inferences based on 
lexicographic rather than compensatory (weighting and adding) decision procedures are more 
accurate in prediction than full-information Bayesian and regression models that simultaneously 
weight and consider all available information.  Berg and Hoffrage (2008) provide theoretical 
explanations for why ignoring free information can be adaptive and successful. Starmer (2005) 
makes a number of relevant points on this issue, and Gilboa, Postlewaite and Schmeidler (2004) 
expand on the arguments of Hammond‘s (1996) regarding the normative insufficiency of internal 
coherence alone.  These authors are highly unusual in expressing doubt about whether Bayesian 
beliefs, and other normative axioms of internal consistency, should be relied upon as normative 
principles. 
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Gaze Heuristic  
 How do baseball players catch fly balls?  Extending Friedman‘s as-if model of how 
billiards players select their shots, one might follow the neoclassical as-if modeling approach and 
assume that baseball players use Newtonian physics.  According to this as-if theory of catching a 
fly ball, players would rely upon variables such as initial position, initial velocity, rotation and 
wind speed, to calculate the terminal position of the ball and optimal direction in which to run.  
 There are several observable facts that are inconsistent with this as-if model, however.  
First, baseball players catching fly balls do not typically run to the landing position of the ball 
and wait for it there.  They frequently run away from the ball first, backing up, before reversing 
course inward toward the ball, which is not predicted by the as-if theory.  Finally, experiments 
that ask baseball players to point to the landing location of the ball reveal that experts with 
specialized training in catching balls have a very difficult time pointing to the landing position of 
the ball.  Nevertheless, because they consistently catch fly balls, these players are employing a 
decision process that gets them to the proper location at the proper time.  This process is the gaze 
heuristic. 
 The gaze heuristic is a genuine process model that explains how the player puts his or her 
body in the proper position to catch fly balls.  When a fly ball is hit, the player waits until the 
ball reaches a sufficiently high altitude.  The player then fixes this angle between his or her body 
and the ball and begins running to maintain this angle at a nearly constant measure.  To keep the 
angle fixed as the ball begins to plummet toward earth, one must run to a position that eventually 
converges to directly under the ball.   
Maintaining a fixed angle between the player and the ball gets the body to the right place 
at the right time.  This process of maintaining the angle implies that sometimes players will have 
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to back up before running inward toward home plate.  This process also does not depend on any 
optimally chosen parameters.  For example, there is a wide and dense range of angles that the 
player can choose to maintain and still catch the ball.  No ―optimal angle‖ is required.   
The benefits of this genuine process model are many.  For one, we have a realistic 
description of how balls are caught, answering to the descriptive goal of science.  For the 
normative and prescriptive dimensions, the benefits are perhaps even more noticeable.  Suppose 
we were to use the as-if model to design a policy intervention aimed at inducing better 
performance catching fly balls.  The as-if theory suggests that we should provide more or clearer 
information about initial position, initial velocity, wind speed and ball rotation.  That could 
mean, for example, that a computer monitor in the outfield instantly providing this information to 
outfielders would improve their performance.  Should we take this seriously?  
 In contrast, the gaze heuristic suggests that patience to allow the ball to reach high 
overhead, good vision to maintain the angle, and fast running speed are among the most 
important inputs into success at catching fly balls.  Thus, process and as-if models make distinct 
predictions (e.g., running in a pattern that keeps the angle between the player and ball fixed 
versus running directly toward the ball and waiting for it under the spot where it will land; and 
being able to point to the landing spot) and lead to distinct policy implications about 
interventions, or designing new institutions, to aid and improve human performance. 
 
Empirical Realism Sold, Bought and Re-Sold 
This section summarizes the historical trajectory of debates about empirical realism in 
economics in the 20
th
 century that is more stylized than detailed, but nevertheless describes a 
hypothesis about the status of claims to realism in economics.  This summary underscores links 
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between debates about, and within, behavioral economics, and the long-standing influence of 
Pareto in the shift away from psychology toward the as-if interpretation of models and de-
emphasis of decision-making process in economics.  Dismissing empirical realism as an 
unneeded element in the methodology of economics, the post-Pareto neoclassical expansion 
under the guidance of Paul Samuelson might be described as: ―empirical realism sold.‖  In other 
words, after Pareto‘s arguments took root in mainstream English language economics, the field 
proceeded as if it no longer cared much about empirical realism regarding the processes that give 
rise to economic decisions.   
When behavioral economics arrived upon the scene, its rhetoric very explicitly tied its 
own program and reason for being to the goal of improved empirical realism.  This initial phase 
of behavioral economics could be referred to as ―empirical realism bought,‖ because 
practitioners of behavioral economics, as it was first trying to reach a broader audience, 
emphasized emphatically a need for psychology and more empirical verification of the 
assumptions of economics.  
Then, perhaps after discovering that the easiest path toward broader acceptance into the 
mainstream was to put forward slightly modified neoclassical models based on constrained 
optimization, the behavioral economics program shed its ambition to empirically describe 
psychological process, adopting Friedman‘s as-if doctrine.  Thus, the second phase in the 
historical trajectory of behavioral economics is described here as: ―empirical realism re-sold.‖ 
 
Realism Sold 
Bruni and Sugden (2007) point out interesting parallels between proponents of behavioral 
economics (who argued for testing the assumptions of the rational choice model with 
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observational data against defenders of neoclassical economics arguing in favor of unbounded 
rationality assumptions) and participants in an earlier methodological debate.  The earlier debate 
took place within neoclassical economics about the role of psychology in economics, in which 
Vilfredo Pareto played a prominent role.  According to Bruni and Sugden, the neoclassical 
program, already underway as Pareto wrote, took a distinct turn as Hicks and Allen, Samuelson, 
and Savage, made use of Pareto‘s arguments against using anything from psychology (e.g., the 
Fechner-Weber Law used earlier as a foundation for assuming diminishing marginal utility, or 
the beginnings of experimental psychology as put forth in Wilhelm Wundt‘s Grundzuge der 
physiologischen Psychologie published in 1874) in economics.  Pareto argued in favor of 
erecting a clear boundary insulating economic assumptions from certain forms of empirical 
inquiry and, rather than inductive empiricism, he advocated much greater emphasis on logical 
deduction.   
The psychology of Pareto‘s day was hardly vacuous as some defenders of the Pareto-led 
shift away from psychology in economics have claimed.  And Pareto was enthusiastic about 
using psychology and sociology to solve applied problems, even as he argued that economics 
should be wholly distinct and reliant solely on its own empirical regularities.  Pareto argued for a 
deductive methodology very much like the contemporary rational choice model in which all 
decisions were to be modeled as solutions to constrained optimization problems.  To understand 
how Pareto could use ideas and data from psychology and sociology in some settings but argue 
unequivocally for eliminating these influences from economics, Bruni and Sugden explain that 
the neoclassical economics of Pareto‘s time, which changed dramatically as a result of his 
positions, was seen as encompassing complementary psychological and economic branches 
within a common research paradigm: 
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This programme was not, as behavioural economics is today, a self-consciously 
distinct branch of the discipline: it was a central component of neoclassical 
economics. Neoclassical economics and experimental psychology were both 
relatively young enterprises, and the boundary between them was not sharply 
defined. According to what was then the dominant interpretation, neoclassical 
theory was based on assumptions about the nature of pleasure and pain. Those 
assumptions were broadly compatible with what were then recent findings in 
psychophysics. Neoclassical economists could and did claim that their theory was 
scientific by virtue of its being grounded in empirically-verified psychological 
laws. … Viewed in historical perspective, behavioural economists are trying to 
reverse a fundamental shift in economics which took place from the beginning of 
the twentieth century: the ‗Paretian turn‘.  This shift, initiated by Vilfredo Pareto 
and completed in the 1930s and 1940s by John Hicks, Roy Allen and Paul 
Samuelson, eliminated psychological concepts from economics by basing 
economic theory on principles of rational choice. 
 Pareto‘s deliberate shift away from psychology also entailed a shift away from large 
categories of empirical source material.  In this sense, the so-called Paretian turn in the 
history of economics can be summarized, perhaps too simply, but not inaccurately, as a 
divestiture of earnest empirical inquiry into the processes by which firms and consumers 
make decisions.  The question of decision process, in the eyes of Pareto, Hicks and 
Samuelson, was a solved problem with a singular answer: choice in economics was defined 
as the solution to an appropriately specified constrained optimization problem.  This relieved 
economics from investigating further the question of how firms and consumers actually make 
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decisions, and shifted the terms of economic analysis toward the business of discovering 
parameters in objective functions and constraint sets, whose maximizing action rule 
(mapping exogenous parameters into actions) seemed to capture the regularities that 
economists regarded, based on introspection, as natural and self-evident, such as downward-
sloping demand curves or diminishing marginal utility.   
 Pareto argued that, for simplification, economics should assume that subjective 
beliefs about the economic environment coincide with objective facts.  Thus, for Pareto and 
many who re-launched Pareto‘s program in the 1930s, the question of how well people‘s 
subjective experience of economic phenomena match the objective structure of the 
environment is assumed away.  There is no question of calibration, or correspondence to the 
real-world.  Pareto defended this by limiting the domain of phenomena to which economic 
theory was to be applied, in sharp contrast to promulgators of the Pareto program who later 
claimed that deductive logic of rational choice models vastly expanded the range of real-
world phenomena to which the theory applies. 
 
Realism Bought 
Advocates for behavioral economics who have come to prominence in the last two 
decades frequently make the case that economics will benefit by more openly embracing the 
empirical lessons of psychological experiments, economic experiments, and standard 
econometric data sources filtered through models that allow for behavioral phenomena, such as 
loss aversion in choice under uncertainty and quasi-hyperbolic discounting in inter-temporal 
choice.  This phase in the history of behavioral economics can be described as ―empirical realism 
bought‖—bought in the sense of the economics discipline siding with arguments made by 
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contemporaries of Pareto who disagreed with him, arguing in favor of using psychological data 
and behavioral regularities put forward by psychologists in economics (e.g., Pantaleoni, 
1889/1960).   
 
Realism Re-Sold  
In an earlier section ―As-If Behavioral Economics,‖ we considered three prominent 
theories, often cited as leading examples of the success of behavioral economics.  We argued, 
however, that these three models are not serious attempts at psychological realism and rather rely 
on Friedman‘s as-if defense to justify modeling psychological choice as the solution to an even 
more elaborate constrained optimization problem.  These models exemplify the ―realism re-sold‖ 
phase in the historical trajectory of behavioral economics.  ―Realism re-sold‖ describes 
behavioral economics‘ retreat from investigating actual decision processes, conforming instead 
to Friedman‘s as-if defense of unrealistic models. The unrealistic models now being defended are 
endowed with additional parameters given psychological labels, resting on the claim that people 
behave as if they are solving a complicated constrained optimization problem with bounds on 
self-interest, willpower, or computational capacity explicitly modeled in the objective function or 
constraint set.  This strange new methodological configuration, motivated in terms of improved 
empirical realism, and defended—not on the grounds of corresponding to actual decision 
processes—but according to the as-if line of defense, can be described as As-If  Behavioral 
Economics. 
 
Pareto as Precursor to As-If 
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To the neoclassicals following Pareto‘s position, an economics defined by axioms of 
perfect internal consistency as the standard of rationality was to provide essential insights into 
how consumers and firms‘ behavior would change when shifting from one equilibrium to 
another as a result of a change in a single exogenous parameter. Thus, the methodology was to 
maintain in all cases—rather than test or investigate—the assumptions of transitive preference 
orderings, expected utility axioms (after Savage), and beliefs that are internally coherent by 
satisfying Bayes Rule.  A number of neoclassical economists acknowledged that predicted 
changes in behavior generated by shifting from one equilibrium to another in response to an 
exogenous change, of course, abstracts from many other influences that are potentially important 
(i.e., those that psychologists and sociologists focus on).   
The neoclassicals argued, however, that their predictions, free from psychological or 
sociological factors, were good enough (ironically, a satisficing argument about the aspirations 
of their theory), and should be interpreted as predictions about behavior after many repetitions 
when, it was assumed, behavior would converge to the ideal choice predicted by rational choice 
theory.  Bruni and Sugden (2007) point out problems with this position, some of which Pareto 
was aware of, and some of which seem to persist in the defenses of rational choice theory offered 
today.   
An interesting point of contrast is the very recent justifications for behavioral economics 
put forward by leading behavioral economists such as Rabin and Thaler, and these same authors‘ 
earlier writings in which much deeper skepticism was occasionally expressed about the utility 
function framework.  An example is Thaler‘s writing in the first round of Journal of Economic 
Perspectives ―Anomalies‖ series, where Thaler‘s conclusions would sometimes mention deep 
doubts that good descriptions of behavior could ever be achieved without deeper methodological 
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revisions in economics.  Not surprisingly, the part of the behavioral economics movement that 
won easiest acceptance was the part which was methodologically closest to neoclassical norms, 
following the path of constrained optimization models with an additional psychological 
parameter or two.    
It is striking that the behavioral economists who successfully sold psychology to 
neoclassical economists are among the most hardened and staunch defenders of the normative 
status of the neoclassical model.  Whereas neoclassical economists frequently interpret their 
models as essentialized approximations, from which deviations are expected to average out in the 
aggregate, many behavioral economists use the rationality standard of neoclassical economics 
more literally and rigidly than their neoclassical colleagues. 
 In contrast to the un-psychological spirit of much writing on psychology in behavioral 
economics, there are some, such as Conlisk (1996), who appreciate that contemporary 
psychology‘s use of the term heuristics (i.e., shortcut decision processes not generally derived by 
solving a constrained optimization problem) often implies a useful shortcut to solving a difficult 
problem—and not a pathological deviation from axiomatic rationality. Particularly when the cost 
of information is high, or the optimization problem has many dimensions that make its solution 
very costly or impossible, a heuristic can provide a valuable procedure for making the decision 
well.  The study of ecological rationality has shown that the function of heuristics is not 
restricted to this short-cut interpretation, also known as the accuracy-effort trade-off.  By 
ignoring information, a heuristic can be more accurate in making predictions in a changing and 
uncertain world than a strategy that does not conditions on all available information—so-called 
less-is-more effects (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009). 
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The debates between behavioral economics and neoclassical economics echo earlier 
debates in economics from the first half of the 20
th
 century.  An interesting dimension of 
historical similarity are the debates about decision-making processes, prominent in the 
psychology literature, but virtually absent in both postwar neoclassical economics and 
contemporary behavioral economics.  These missing debates about decision-making process in 
economics concern whether constrained optimization is realistic or empirically justified, and 
whether a more directly empirical account of decision-making process can lead to better 
descriptive and normative economics.  The seemingly opposing subfields of neoclassical and 
behavioral economics, it seems, rely on a common rhetorical strategy that traces back to the 
methodological shifts in economics away from psychology around the time of Pareto.   
 
If Economics Becomes an Empirical Science… 
Critiques Of Rationality Assumptions Are Nothing New 
 Long before the contemporary behavioral economics program came to prominence, the 
economics discipline saw a good deal of complaining about the strictures of rationality 
assumptions—especially the ones required to rationalize a utility function representation of a 
preference ordering, and the self-interested rational actor model—long before Herbert Simon or 
the current leaders of the behavioral economics program began writing. One recalls Veblen‘s 
conspicuous consumption in The Theory of the Working Class (1899), Keynes‘s  ―animal spirits‖ 
in the general theory (1936), Galbraith‘s ―Rational and Irrational Consumer Preference‖ (1938), 
and Hayek‘s (1945) critique of the disconnect between maximization of given preferences over 
known choice sets versus ―the economic problem which society faces,‖ which rests on the 
radical limitations on economic actors‘ knowledge.  
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In fact, earlier writers before the rise of general equilibrium theory and subsequent 
ascendancy of highly rationalist game theory in the 1980s frequently expressed interest in 
decision processes other than those posited in the rational choice model.  One finds deep 
sympathy in Smith‘s (1759/1997) writings on sentiments, and in writers going back to antiquity 
(Bruni and Porta, 2007), for the proposition that economic behavior takes multiple forms 
depending on social context.
6
  In this light, it would seem that the singularity of the rational 
choice model within neoclassical economists‘ methodological toolkit in post-war North 
American economics (together with its strict normative interpretation) is anomalous when 
compared to longer-standing norms allowing for a much wider range of behavioral models in 
economics.  
Proponents of genuine process models would argue that, especially when predicting how 
a new policy or institution will perform, the range of variation in the data used to fit various 
models may not give illuminating predictions over the relevant ranges of variables after policy 
and institutions shift.  If the actual process generating economic decisions is better understood, 
however, then social science has a firmer basis to make important predictions about behavior 
under new and imagined institutional arrangements.  Process models would therefore play a 
crucial role in furthering both the creativity and predictive accuracy of economists attempting to 
imagine and design new institutions—where success hangs upon how such institutions might 
interact with the repertoire of heuristics and behavioral rules widely used in a population. 
 
Naming Problem
7
 
                                               
6
Ashraf, Camerer and Loewenstein‘s (2007) article, ―Adam Smith, Behavioral Economist,‖ 
pushes this claim to an extreme. 
7 The term behavioral economics seems to have been coined by the psychologist George Katona, who established 
the Survey Research Center (SRC), part of the Institute for Social Research (IRS) at University of Michigan. Amos 
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In thinking about future histories of behavioral economics, the term ―behavioral‖ itself is 
already problematic on two counts at least.  First, as many have pointed out, it seems ironic that a 
social science would need to call itself ―behavioral‖—distinguishing itself from apparently non-
behavioral social sciences?  Given the anti-empirical flavor of as-if defenses of economic 
analysis that is explicitly uncurious about the ―black box‖ of mind that generates economic 
decisions, the behavioral label could have implied a useful critique.  However, when one digs 
into the methodological arguments put forward in behavioral economics, the apparent 
distinctions appear slight.   
At a recent meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics, one 
board member suggested that the group dissolve, arguing that behavioral economics had become 
mainstream, and therefore no distinction or group to advocate on its behalf was needed.  Whether 
this merging of behavioral economics and mainstream economics represents a change in the 
mainstream or a capitulation of the motive behind the behavioral program aimed at improved 
realism is open to debate. 
A second aspect of the naming problem inherent in ―behavioral economics,‖ which may 
seem trivial, but underscores links to another research program that has run into serious barriers, 
is potential confusion with the behaviorist movement.  Behaviorism is very much distinct from 
both the behavioralism of pre-Pareto neoclassicals and contemporary behavioral economists.  
(John Broadus Watson published his treatise on the behaviorist approach to psychology in 1913).  
Bruni and Sugden (2007) describe the behaviorist movement in psychology as having ―denied 
the scientific status of introspection.‖  This is almost equivalent to the denial by some 
economists, both behavioral and neoclassical, that actual decision processes of firms and 
                                                                                                                                                       
Tversky obtained his PhD at the University of Michigan under the supervision of Clyde Coombs and Ward 
Edwards. 
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consumers are important—that only outcomes of decision processes are appropriate objects for 
scientific inquiry.  Thus, one important theme of the behaviorist program agrees with the as-if 
Friedman doctrine, carried forward in contemporary behavioral economics by those who argue 
that the goal of their models is not to provide a veridical description of the actual decision 
processes being used by economic agents, but to predict the outcome (a particular action or 
decision). 
 
The Route Not (Yet?) Taken: Process Models Addressing EU Violations, Time Inconsistency, and 
Other-Regarding Behavior 
 Economists like Herbert Simon, Reinhardt Selten, and Vernon Smith illustrate that there 
is a positive route not taken in behavioral economics, which is more empirical, more open to 
alternative normative interpretations of deviations from neoclassical theory, and more descriptive 
of actual decision processes rather than reliant on extensions of Friedman‘s as-if methodology.  
Perhaps counterintuitively, the issue of normative interpretation is critical for these thinkers in 
gauging how far their descriptive work can move away from neoclassical theory and achieve 
more data-driven descriptions of how decisions are made.  Simon, for example, thought that 
expected utility theory was both normative and descriptively inadequate.  Selten proposes 
elaborate satisficing explanations of choice under uncertainty. And Vernon Smith holds that if 
someone consciously violates EU, then this does not imply that he or she made an error.  
Regarding the three examples of as-if behavioral economics given in the second section 
in this paper, one can point to genuine process models that handle the very same behavioral 
phenomena without as-if justification.  Tversky‘s elimination by aspects described a process to 
choose between two alternatives that could be gambles.  Unfortunately, Tversky abandoned his 
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attempts to use lexicographic structure to model choice under uncertainty when he joined 
Kahneman and turned to the repair program.  The priority heuristic, mentioned earlier, is another 
process model, and it predicts the experimental data better than as-if cumulative prospect theory.   
Regarding time inconsistency, Rubinstein (2003) put forward a process model for 
temporal discounting that provides an attractive alternative to the as-if hyperbolic discounting 
story.  The ecological rationality of various forms of time-inconsistency was documented by 
Leland (2002), Rosati et al. (2007) and Heilbroner et al. (2008), who showed that characteristics 
of the decision maker‘s environment can explain some differences in discount rates.  For 
example, if one lives among lots of greedy companions rather than alone, this tends to make one 
less patient. 
Regarding other-regarding behavior, Henrich et al. (2001) tried but could not find Homo 
Economicus in 15 small-scale societies in remote locations.  They found that offers and 
rejections in the ultimatum game are related to extent to which these societies‘ production 
technologies required workers to cooperate (e.g., hunting in groups) or fend for themselves (e.g., 
gathering food alone).  Carpenter and Seki (2006) report a similar finding about two groups of 
Japanese fishermen and women.  They find that groups who pool the payoffs from all boats‘ 
daily catches play the ultimatum game much more cooperatively than groups that reward the 
members of each boat more individualistically based on the value of each boat‘s own daily catch. 
 
Empirical Realism: Past to Present 
Bruni and Sugden (2007) in their discussion of Hicks and other founders of contemporary 
neoclassical economics (vis a vis neoclassical economics before Pareto‘s influence came to 
dominate) write: 
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If economics is to be a separate science, based on laws whose truth is to be 
treated as axiomatic, we have to be very confident in those laws. Otherwise, 
we are in danger of creating an complex structure of internally consistent 
theory which has no correspondence with reality. 
This correspondence with reality is the essence of the empirical approach to economics.  How 
else do we get to be ―very confident‖ in the laws of economics? 
The origins of behavioral economics are many, without clear boundaries or singularly 
defining moments.  And yet, even a cursory look at articles published in economics today versus, 
say, 1980, reveals a far-reaching, distinctly behavioral shift.
8
  A striking element in the 
arguments of those who have successfully brought behavioral economics to mainstream 
economics audiences is the close similarity to Friedman‘s as-if defense.  
 In prospect theory, behavioral economics has added parameters rather than psychological 
realism to model choice under uncertainty.  In modeling other-regarding behavior, utility 
functions have been supplemented with parameters weighting decision makers‘ concern for 
receiving more, or less, than the group average.  Time inconsistency observed in experiments has 
prompted a large empirical effort to pin down parameters in objective functions that hang onto 
the assumption of maximization of a time-separable utility function, but with non-exponential 
                                               
8
 One can cite many concrete events as markers of the emergence of behavioral economics, or 
psychology and economics, onto a broader stage with wide, mainstream appeal.  One might 
imagine that such a list would surely include Herbert Simon‘s Nobel Prize in 1978.  But that was 
a time at which very little behavioral work appeared in the flagship general interest journals of 
the economics profession.  A concise and of course incomplete timeline would include: Richard 
Thaler‘s ―Anomalies‖ series, which ran in the Journal of Economic Perspectives starting in 
1987; hiring patterns at elite business schools and economics departments in the 1990s; frequent 
popular press accounts of behavioral economics in The Economist, New York Times and Wall 
Street Journal in the last 10 years; and the 2002 Nobel Prize being awarded to an experimental 
economist and a psychologist.  The 1994 Nobel Prize was shared by another economist who is an 
active experimenter, Reinhardt Selten. 
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weighting schemes that have taken on psychological labels that purport to measure problems 
with willpower.  Described as a new empirical enterprise to learn the true preferences of real 
people, the dominant method in behavioral economics can be better described as filtering 
observed action through otherwise neoclassical constrained optimization problems with new 
arguments and parameters in the utility function. 
We have tried to investigate to what extent behavioral economists‘ attempts to filter data 
through more complexly parameterized constrained optimization problems succeeds in achieving 
improved empirical realism and, in so doing, distinguishing behavioral from neoclassical 
economics. The primary finding is that of widespread similarity in the neoclassical and 
behavioral research programs.  This suggests common limitations in their ultimate historical 
trajectories and scientific achievements. To become more genuinely helpful in improving the 
predictive accuracy and descriptive realism of economic models, more attention to decision 
process will be required, together will bolder normative investigation using a broader set of 
prescriptive criteria. 
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